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Sweden, Finland and Denmark have seen a revival of the debate on the Nord Stream 2 project in 
recent months. As the planned gas pipeline will run through these countries’ exclusive economic 
zones and/or territorial waters, the governments in Stockholm, Helsinki and Copenhagen will 
have to take a decision on NS2 construction soon. They find themselves in a difficult situation. 
On one hand, the Russian-Ukrainian war and the deteriorating security situation in the Baltic 
Sea region have resulted in more distance towards Russian economic projects in these countries. 
All of them have also come under increasing pressure from the United States, the CEE countries, 
and domestic opposition parties, which have been demanding the project’s suspension. On the 
other hand, neither Stockholm, Helsinki nor Copenhagen wants to use their national laws or the 
Law of the Sea to block Nord Stream 2, which enjoys support from Germany.
Sweden, Finland and Denmark are therefore unlikely to block or slow down the procedures of 
issuing national approvals for the pipeline’s construction. However, they expect the European 
Commission to assess the compliance of Nord Stream 2 with the EU’s Third Energy Package. 
In addition, Stockholm and Copenhagen in particular want the EU to take a common political 
stance on the project, based on the assessment of Nord Stream 2’s conformity with the objec-
tives of EU energy and climate policy as well as the EU’s security interests. 
Nord Stream 2’s route through 
the Nordic countries: the legal aspects
According to the plans, Nord Stream 2 (NS2) 
would run in parallel to two existing lines of the 
Nord Stream 1 pipeline (NS1) via the exclusive 
economic zones (EEZ) of Finland (375 km) and 
Sweden (500 km), and the EEZ and territorial 
waters of Denmark (a total of 140 km; see Map). 
In the case of the first two lines of NS1, the Nord 
Stream company has successfully applied for 
building permits in all three countries. This was 
granted in 2009, and at that time all the pro-
cedures took around three years to complete1. 
1 The bodies responsible for the issue of the relevant per-
mits are: in Finland, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment; in Sweden, the Ministry of Enterprise and 
Innovation; and in Denmark, the state Energy Agency.
In the case of NS2, the Nord Stream 2 compa-
ny submitted its first application in Sweden for 
a permit to lay the underwater pipeline in the 
Swedish EEZ on 16 September 2016, and anno-
unced that it would submit the corresponding 
applications in Finland and Denmark at the be-
ginning of 2017. 
On the basis of the Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, Denmark can refuse consent for the 
NS2 gas pipeline to be constructed in its terri-
torial waters to the southeast of the island of 
Bornholm, where it has the complete freedom 
to authorise the laying of pipelines. It would 
become necessary to move the NS2’s route to 
the EEZs of Denmark or Sweden which would 
complicate the implementation of the project. 
To the north of Bornholm, a heavily-used ship-
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ping route runs through the Danish and Swe-
dish EEZs, which would impede the laying of 
the gas pipeline. To the south of Bornholm, 
the Polish and Danish EEZs are not delimited; 
constructing the gas pipeline in this area wo-
uld thus be associated with legal controver-
sies, which would extend the entire process. 
Finland and Sweden, on the basis of the Law 
of the Sea, have practically no freedom to block 
the construction of the NS2 pipeline in their 
exclusive economic zones, where the freedom 
to lay pipelines exists. However, laying out the 
routes of such pipelines in the EEZs requires the 
consent of the coastal state. It is granted on the 
basis of an assessment of the project’s impact 
on the environment; and so both countries co-
uld prolong this process2. 
The sceptical Swedes: consent from the 
government, veto from the EU?
The debate on the NS2 project in Sweden accele-
rated at the end of August 2016 due to the visit of 
the US Vice-President Joe Biden, who urged the 
Swedish government to adopt a negative stance 
2 In order to apply for consent from the above-mentioned 
states, the company is obliged to honour the Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, dating from 1982. In accor-
dance with the Convention, in an EEZ all states enjoy the 
freedoms  of  navigation  and  overflight,  the laying of 
submarine cables and pipelines, and other internation-
ally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, 
such as those associated with the operation  of  ships, 
aircraft  and  submarine  cables  and  pipelines. The pro-
cedures for environmental impact assessment are gov-
erned by the 1991 Espoo Convention (Convention on 
environmental impact assessment in a trans-boundary 
context). The parties to the Convention are all Baltic Sea 
states with the exception of Russia (which has not rati-
fied it), although it did apply its regulations during the 
construction of the NS1 gas pipeline.
towards the project3. Before the visit, represen-
tatives of the left-wing government of PM Stefan 
Löfven (who heads a coalition of Social Demo-
crats and Greens) were reluctant and cautious 
in speaking out on this issue. The debate was 
shaped by the conservative opposition – the Mo-
derates, the Centre Party, Christian Democrats 
and Liberals4 – who took advantage of the sub-
ject to criticise the government and call for the 
Swedish Foreign Ministry to take strong action 
to block the project. Joe Biden’s visit led to the 
Swedish government adopting a more sceptical 
and decisive position. This changed attitude was 
clearly visible in the statements by Foreign Mini-
ster Margot Wallström during discussions in the 
Swedish parliament on 6 September this year5. 
The Swedish government’s overall sceptical po-
sition towards the project is also reinforced by 
the fact that demand for natural gas in Sweden is 
very low (around 4% of domestic consumption); 
20% of this demand is covered by domestic pro-
duction, with the remaining 80% being covered 
by imports from Denmark. Sweden has no busi-
ness ties with Gazprom. 
The Swedish debate on NS2 gives reason to 
conclude that the government will permit the 
gas pipeline route to run through the Swedish 
EEZ and will not use environmental procedures 
to delay the construction. Ensuring that rela-
tions between states are based on internatio-
nal law is in the vital interest of Sweden, which 
is a relatively small country with considerable 
regional and global ties, and moreover remains 
outside military alliances. Sweden’s reasoning 
is that, since Stockholm urges Russia to comply 
3 Katri Svarfvar, ‘Biden: Nordstream en ”dålig affär”’, SVT 
Nyheter, 25 August 2016, http://www.svt.se/nyheter/in-
rikes/biden-nordstream-en-dalig-affar 
4 The construction of the NS2 was criticised most harshly 
in Swedish discussions by representatives of the Chris-
tian Democrats (who currently have 3.2% support in the 
polls) and the Liberals (currently 5% support).
5 The discussion was preceded by Foreign Minister’s an-
swer to the parliamentary question on Nord Stream 2. 
See Riksdagens snabbprotokoll 2015/16:130, Svar på in-
terpellation 2015/16:753 om Nordstream 2, 8 September 
2016, https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/do-
kument/interpellationsdebatt/nordstream-2_H310753 
Finland and Sweden, on the basis of the Law 
of the Sea, are practically not able to block 
the construction of the NS2 pipeline in their 
exclusive economic zones.
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with international law, Sweden itself should do 
the same. However, the Swedish government 
is sceptical about the construction of the NS2 
gas pipeline, which it perceives as a geopo-
litical project, intended to increase the EU’s 
dependence on gas from Russia, and thus on 
political pressure from the Kremlin. Sweden is 
also afraid that Russia could use the pipeline as 
an excuse to intensify its military operations in 
the Baltic Sea to protect the gas infrastructure. 
As it sees no legal possibility of blocking the 
pipeline’s construction on the national level, 
Sweden favours stopping the project in the EU. 
Stockholm expects the European Commission to 
assess NS2’s compliance with the Third Energy 
Package. It also wants a political discussion and 
decision on NS2 to be taken at the level of the 
Council of the EU or the European Council, ba-
sed on the assessment of the project’s conformi-
ty with the objectives of EU energy and climate 
policy, as well as the EU’s security interests. Swe-
dish Foreign Minister has thus declared Swedish 
readiness to cooperate with the Baltic Sea states 
in order to counteract the project on a political 
level within the EU. However, Sweden will not 
actively engage in blocking NS2, if it considers 
the likelihood of success to be too small. 
Sweden’s current position and the national di-
scussion on the NS2 gas pipeline resemble the 
situation in 2009. At that time too, the con-
struction of the NS1 pipeline was the subject of 
political controversy: the conservative govern-
ment was unenthusiastic about the project, and 
the left-wing opposition openly advocated aga-
inst it, citing environmental and security argu-
ments. However, the government did not want 
to prolong or block the administrative proce-
dures relating to the construction of NS1 in the 
Swedish EEZ. It also did not want to participate 
at the political level in the coalition seeking to 
block the NS1 project in the EU, which was sup-
ported then by the biggest EU member states. 
Sweden was also holding the EU presidency in 
the second half of 2009, during which the buil-
ding permits were to be issued, and wanted to 
be on good terms, and find compromises in the 
area of climate policy, with Russia. Swedish go-
vernment granted thus the permit for the NS1’s 
construction in the Swedish EEZ in November 
2009, after it requested the Nord Stream com-
pany to supplement the environmental docu-
mentation in February 2008. Due to Sweden’s 
scepticism regarding the plans to construct 
a service platform for the construction of the 
pipeline near Gotland, the Nord Stream compa-
ny itself withdrew from this idea.
If the project is implemented, Sweden (like Fin-
land) will benefit economically from the con-
struction of NS2. At the same time, however, the 
possible use of Swedish ports by Nord Stream 2 
company is a concern for Stockholm. The Nord 
Stream company plans to use the ports of Karl-
shamn (in the south of Sweden) and Slite (on 
Gotland) to store the pipes, although no con-
tracts have been signed yet. Local authorities 
are positively geared towards building NS2 due 
to the investments in the port infrastructures, 
the additional income and employment. At the 
national level, however, Swedish politicians, 
military and experts are warning that Russia 
could use both ports for sabotage activities 
against Sweden due to their strategic locations; 
the port of Slite is located on Gotland, which 
is a strategic location for security of the who-
le Baltic Sea region, and Karlshamn is near the 
Swedish navy’s main base in Karlskrona. 
The neutral Finns:  
unwillingness to politicise the project
In Finland, a wider discussion on the NS2 pro-
ject may be expected after the Nord Stream 2 
company submits its application for a construc-
Sweden is most sceptical about the con-
struction of the NS2 gas pipeline, and fa-
vours stopping the project at the EU level.
4OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 223
tion permit (probably by February 2017). As 
yet, the NS2 project has not sparked a political 
debate in Finland. Representatives of the centre
-right government of PM Juha Sipilä (made up 
of the Centre Party, the Finns Party and the Na-
tional Coalition Party) have hardly said a word 
on the subject, until the government was for-
ced to take an official position in response to 
a parliamentary question in September 2016. 
The public discussion about NS2 was also revi-
ved by the echoes of Joe Biden’s visit to Swe-
den, as well as a report on Russia published by 
the Finnish think-tank FIIA (30 August; the re-
port was commissioned by the government)6. 
The FIIA report refers to the NS2 gas pipeline as 
a geo-economic project, which will marginalise 
the importance of Ukraine as a gas transit co-
untry; create a gas dependency with Germany 
that will increase Russia’s ability to exert politi-
cal and economic pressure on Berlin; and un-
dermine the EU’s energy policy. It recommends 
that Finnish decision-makers engage in efforts 
to develop a joint EU position on the political 
level, while at the same time discouraging them 
from raising environmental issues in the Finnish 
EEZ in order to block the project. However, the 
report is unlikely to affect the government’s 
neutral position on the NS2. 
The Finnish government will not use the environ-
mental impact assessment procedure in order 
to delay implementation of the project, and will 
allow the gas pipeline to be laid in the Finnish 
exclusive economic zone. Helsinki is treating the 
planned gas pipeline as a business initiative, as it 
6 Toivo Martikainen, Katri Pynnöniemi, Sinikukka Saa-
ri, Venäjän muuttuva rooli Suomen lähialueilla, FIIA, 
30 August 2016, http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/607/
venajan_muuttuva_rooli_suomen_lahialueilla/ 
did in the case of NS1, and has adopted a neutral 
stance towards the project, not seeing any inte-
rest in either promoting or blocking it7. At the 
same time, Finland is waiting for the European 
Commission’s assessment on whether NS2 com-
plies with the Third Energy Package. In contrast 
to Stockholm, Helsinki is against using political 
arguments to block the planned gas pipeline in 
the EU. Finland does not want to politicise the 
project for two reasons. Like Sweden, it attaches 
great importance to compliance with internatio-
nal law. Furthermore, it does not want to politi-
cise environmental issues in relations with Rus-
sia since protection of the Baltic Sea basin is an 
important objective of Finland’s regional policy, 
with Russia being largely responsible for the pol-
lution of the waters of the Gulf of Finland. At the 
same time, Finland is committed to economic 
cooperation with Russia, and is seeking to deve-
lop it in those areas not covered by sanctions8. 
Finland has maintained an attitude of benevo-
lent neutrality towards the NS1 project. The 
original plans to build an undersea gas pipe-
line linking Russia and Germany were to have 
been carried out by the Russian-Finnish compa-
ny North Transgas (later the Nord Stream com-
pany), which was created in 1997. However, in 
2005, as part of a restructuring plan, the Finnish 
energy group Fortum sold its 50% stake in the 
company to Gazprom. Finland thus treated the 
NS1 project as a business initiative, and gran-
ted its construction permit in November 2009, 
while making it conditional on several environ-
mental factors (prohibiting the ships laying the 
pipeline from anchoring; imposing a special tax 
to cover fishing losses). Finland does not see 
any risks in energy cooperation with Russia. 
7 The Finnish government’s response to a parliamentary 
question on Nord Stream 2. See Vastaus kirjalliseen ky-
symykseen Nord Stream 2 – hankkeen turvalli-suuspoliit-
tisen ulottuvuuden huomioimisesta, 28 September 2016, 
https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Kysymys/Documents/
KKV_426+2016.pdf#search=Nord%20Stream%202 
8 Examples of energy cooperation include the Finnish 
energy group Fortum’s investments in Russia, and the 
choice of ROSATOM as the contractor for a new nuclear 
reactor at the Pyhäjoki nuclear power plant (2015).
Finland treats the planned NS2 pipeline 
as a business initiative, and has adopted 
a neutral stance towards the project.
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It imports 100% of its gas from Russia and con-
siders Gazprom a reliable partner, because – in 
contrast to the CEE countries – it has not expe-
rienced any politically motivated interruptions 
in the supply of Russian gas. Until recently, Gaz-
prom also held a 25% stake in Gasum, the ope-
rator of the Finnish gas transmission network, 
until the Third Energy Package came into force, 
when the Finnish government bought its sha-
res. In addition, natural gas is of little impor-
tance in domestic energy consumption, amo-
unting to no more than around 7% in 2015. 
Finland does not have a well-developed trans-
mission network (it is only found in the south 
of the country), and recognises the problem of 
being dependent on a single gas connection 
with Russia (Imatra-Tampere), and so it is inve-
sting in the construction of small LNG termi-
nals and a pipeline connection with Estonia9.
In Finland some quite powerful interest groups 
are lobbying for the NS2 project, expecting be-
nefits for the Finnish economy associated with 
establishing logistics centres for the pipeline’s 
construction in the Finnish ports of Kotka and 
Hanko. At the same time, in contrast to Sweden, 
the Finnish government perceives no threats to 
the country’s security in the use of its EEZ and 
ports for the pipeline’s construction. The cre-
ation of NS2 is supported by the biggest Finnish 
trade union (the Metalworkers’ Union), which 
has considerable political influence. The pipes 
would be coated and stored in the port of Kotka, 
9 In September 2016, the first small-scale LNG terminal was 
opened in Pori. In the coming years there are plans to open 
more LNG terminals (in Tornio, Hamina and Rauma). In ad-
dition, by 2020 there should be a pipeline connection with 
Estonia (Balticconnector), which will link Finland to the Eu-
ropean network of gas pipelines via the Baltic States.
and also stored in the port of Hanko. The neces-
sary infrastructure is already in place, since both 
ports were involved in the construction of NS1. 
The trade union hopes that the construction of 
NS2 would create jobs for about 300 people in 
both cities (unemployment in Kotka, a town of 
around 55,000 inhabitants, exceeds 20% and is 
among the highest in the country). 
The ‘wait-and-see’ Danes: between 
Germany and the US 
The real debate on the project in Denmark will 
begin only when the Nord Stream 2 company 
applies for a permit to construct the gas pipe-
line in the Danish EEZ and territorial waters at 
the beginning of 2017. So far, discussions on the 
matter have been sporadic and superficial, and 
the statements by representatives of the mino-
rity government of PM Lars Løkke Rasmussen 
(who heads the liberal Venstre party) have been 
very restrained. The debate was briefly revived 
in July thanks to an appeal by the Polish, Lithu-
anian and Estonian foreign ministers to the 
Danish government to block the pipeline’s con-
struction. The construction of the NS2 is backed 
by the nationalist Danish People’s Party, which 
supports the Venstre party’s government; me-
anwhile some opposition leftist politicians, 
mainly from the Social Liberals (a small party) 
and the Social Democrats (the largest party in 
Parliament), oppose the construction of NS210. 
In Denmark there are no strong interest groups 
lobbying for the construction of NS2, although 
if the project does get underway, it could po-
tentially be of benefit to the Danish consulting 
and law firms which advised the Nord Stream 
company on NS1 project. 
Denmark will not block or delay the project on 
the basis of national law or the Law of the Sea. 
10 The former foreign minister (2014-2015), Martin Lidegaard 
(of the social-liberal party), who is the biggest critic of the 
project, appealed to the government to develop a joint 
negative stance towards the construction of the pipeline 
together with Sweden and Finland (and also in the EU).
On the basis of the Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, Denmark can refuse consent 
for the NS2 gas pipeline to be constructed 
in its territorial waters.
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Copenhagen may be expected to agree to the 
delineation of the NS2’s route in their EEZ and 
territorial waters. Currently, however, the Da-
nish government has adopted a wait-and-see 
attitude, announcing that it will not underta-
ke any analyses, and will not adopt a position 
before the Nord Stream company’s applica-
tion for a building permit has been submitted. 
The Danish government has adopted this attitu-
de for several reasons. Denmark wants to avoid 
a situation in which it would have to unambi-
guously back either the supporters of the pipeli-
ne project (mainly Germany, its most important 
economic partner) or its opponents (primarily 
the US, its key ally in security policy, as well as 
the CEE countries). The Danes are aware of the 
geopolitical dimension of the NS2 project. Ho-
wever, they attaches great importance to com-
pliance with the Law of the Sea, and the Danish 
interpretation of it obliges the state to agree to 
the construction of the pipelines in its territorial 
waters. In addition, the Convention on the Law 
of the Sea plays a key role in Danish policy in the 
Arctic, as it provides the basis for resolving the 
issue of overlapping Danish and Russian claims 
to the continental shelf. Denmark is therefore 
counting on the EU to take the responsibility 
for the fate of the project. Copenhagen’s hope 
is that the European Commission will adopt 
a formal position on the project’s compatibili-
ty with the Third Energy Package, and that the 
political discussions on the project will be held 
in the European Council11.
11 Statement by the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Kristian Jensen, in the Danish Parliament. See Folketing-
et, Udenrigsministerens sikkerhedspolitiske redegørelse 
2015, December 2015, http://www.ft.dk/samling/20151/
redegoerelse/r8/beh1/forhandling.htm?startItem=230     
Denmark’s room for manoeuvre on the issue of 
the NS2 construction is also limited by its pre-
vious consent to have the NS1 pipeline laid in 
the Danish EEZ and territorial waters. This was 
granted in October 2009 by the government of 
Lars Løkke Rasmussen (the current Prime Mini-
ster), which treated the NS1 as a business initia-
tive. In addition, the Danish gas business sees 
the purchase of Russian gas as an investment in 
the diversification of supply sources. The pro-
cess of granting environmental consent to NS1 
came at the moment when extraction of natural 
gas in Denmark had started to drop off, in con-
nection with the exhaustion of Danish fields in 
the North Sea12. The largest Danish state energy 
company DONG then started to import small 
amounts of gas from abroad in order to incre-
ase the security of supply to the internal market 
and to Sweden. Part of this strategy involved 
investment in Norwegian gas fields, as well as 
agreements with Gazprom (2006 and 2009) 
for gas deliveries via the NS1 pipeline and the 
network in Germany13. Today, despite gas im-
ports from Norway and Russia, Denmark is still 
an energy-independent state and a net expor-
ter of both oil and natural gas. There is no dan-
ger of Denmark increasing its dependence on 
Russian gas in the future. For several years now, 
Copenhagen has consistently pursued a policy 
of total transition to renewable energy by 2050, 
and is gradually moving away from fossil fuels 
in its national energy consumption14.
12 Their operation is estimated to end in 2045-2050.
13 In 2015, DONG bought 672 million m3 of Russian gas 
(representing around  0.5% of Gazprom’s exports to 
Europe). See ‘Gazprom export, Denmark’, http://www.
gazpromexport.ru/en/partners/denmark/ 
14 Denmark will probably remain a net exporter of nat-
ural gas until 2025. In 2014, the share of natural gas 
in the Danish national energy consumption amount-
ed to 16.6% (a figure which is falling). Energinet, ‘Gas 
consumption and supplies, 2015-2050’, http://www.
energinet.dk/EN/GAS/Udfordringer-for-gassen-i-frem-
tiden-ny/Gasforbrug-og--leverancer-2015-2050/Sider/
default.aspx; The European Statistical Office, http://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/energy/data/database 
Denmark has adopted a wait-and-see 
attitude, announcing that it will not adopt 
a position before the company’s applica-
tion for a building permit is submitted.
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MAP
The planned route of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline
Source: Gazprom Export, Nord Stream and the Nord Stream pipeline scheme, map 2; http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/projects/
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